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A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MASSACHUSETTS 

NOTORIETY-FOR-PROFIT LAW: THE 

GRANDSON OF SAM 

SEAN J. KEALY* 
"No one [should] be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to 
take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his 
own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime."l 
INTRODucnON 
In recent years, two women stood convicted of highly publi­
cized major crimes in Massachusetts. Katherine Ann Power 
("Power") was a fugitive who committed felony-murder in 1970. 
She led a life on the run as a fugitive until 1993 when she revealed 
* Sean Kealy is Legal Counsel for the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice for 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He was formerly an Assistant Attorney General 
assigned to the Division of Victim Compensation and Assistance within the Massachu­
setts Office of the Attorney General's Family and Community Crimes Bureau. The 
opinions within this paper are Mr. Kealy's and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Attorney General's Office or the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice. The author 
thanks Susan Kealy, Stacey G. Bloom, Noelle Byrnes, Diane Juliar, Judy Beals, Carolyn 
Keshian, and Michael Harris for their assistance in writing and revising this Article. 
1. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 119 (1991) (quoting Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188,190 (N.Y. 1889)). 
1 
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her true identity and surrendered to authorities to face the conse­
quences of her crimes.2 Louise Woodward ("Woodward"), an au 
pair originally from England, gained notoriety on both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean when she was convicted of killing the baby en­
trusted to her care.3 Both women captured the attention of the na­
tional media for months and reportedly had opportunities to sell 
their images, stories, and opinions for huge amounts of money.4 
The court system, however, dealt with these infamous defendants in 
two drastically different ways. In the Power case, the sentencing 
judge made it a specific condition of her probation that she could 
never profit from her crime.5 Woodward's sentence, by contrast, 
did not include any conditions to keep her from profiting from her 
notoriety.6 A lesson to be learned from the differential handling of 
these cases is that Massachusetts needs a law that specifically ad­
dresses whether and to what extent a criminal may profit from his 
or her heinous, albeit sensational, crimes. A notoriety-for-profit 
law7 would provide a means of regulating these high profile situa­
tions in a manner that consistently protects the rights of people 
whose victimizers have become media stars. 
2. See Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Mass. 1995). Power became 
involved in radical activities while a student at Brandeis University. See Shaun B. Spen­
cer, Note, Does Crime Pay-Can Probation Stop Katherine Ann Power from Selling Her 
Story?, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1203, 1205 (1994). She and several other activists planned to 
rob a bank to help fund the Black Panthers. See id. at 1205-06. On September 23, 
1970, Power drove the get-away car while three accomplices robbed the State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. in Brighton, Mass., and a fourth accomplice sat outside the bank as a 
lookout. See Power, 650 N.E.2d at 88. Tho Boston Police officers responded to a silent 
alarm triggered in the bank. See id. As one of the officers entered the bank, he was 
fatally shot in the back by the lookout. See id. All of the defendant's accomplices were 
apprehended-three within a short period of time and the fourth several years later. 
See id. Power, however, settled in Oregon under an assumed name and successfully 
avoided apprehension for over twenty years. See id. In September 1993, she finally 
surrendered to the Massachusetts authorities. See id. at 88-89. 
3. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (Mass. 1998). 
4. See Carol Midgley, No Deal Will Be Struck on Story Until After Appeal, Times 
(London), Nov. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9242321. Before her conviction, Wood­
ward had been offered £50,000 by the Daily Mail contingent upon her acquittal. See id. 
Lord Rothermere, chairman of the Daily Mail and General Trust, defended the offer by 
saying, "if you pay convicted people for their story it enables the victim to sue for 
compensation." Id. For a discussion on Power's opportunities to cash in on her crime 
see Greater Boston (WGBH television broadcast, Nov. 17,1997). 
5. See Power, 650 N.E.2d at 89. 
6. See David Talbot, Nanny Goes Free; Big Unknown: Will Woodward Profit from 
Case?, BOSTON HERALD, June 17, 1998, at 10. 
7. See infra Part LA for a discussion of notoriety-for-profit laws. 
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Over the last twenty years, over 40 states8 and the federal gov­
ernment9 have passed legislation to prevent offenders from profit­
ing from their crimes. These notoriety-for-profit or "Son of Sam"l0 
laws serve two important governmental purposes: (1) they prevent 
criminals from profiting from their wrongdoing and (2) they com­
pensate crime victims.ll However, in 1991, in Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.,12 the 
United States Supreme Court found the first Son of Sam law ever 
passed unconstitutional.13 Because the New York law was a model 
for many other states, including Massachusetts, all Son of Sam stat­
utes have since been reexamined for similar flaws.14 Massachusetts' 
own Son of Sam statute was repealed.15 The Victim's Compensa­
tion statute that followed resolved the constitutional problem by 
wholly eliminating a notoriety provision from its text.16 However, 
the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and the Massachu­
setts Office of Victim Assistance have filed a new Son of Sam bill 
with the legislature that provides a constitutional and effective pro­
cess for protecting the rights of victims.17 
The first part of this Article will examine the history of Son of 
Sam statutes, including the genesis of the original New York stat­
ute, and the Simon & Schuster decision that ultimately invalidated 
the statute. Part I will also examine possible methods of creating a 
constitutional Son of Sam statute. Part II discusses whether a Son 
of Sam law is necessary or desirable from a legal and policy stand­
point. Part III examines the various proposals to replace the Son of 
Sam statute in Massachusetts in the wake of Simon & Schuster and 
further provides a detailed description of the notoriety-for-profit 
bill currently pending before the Massachusetts Legislature. Fi­
nally, this Article concludes that Massachusetts should have a Son 
8. See infra note 36 for a complete list of states that have passed Son of Sam 
statutes since 1977. 
9. See 18 U.S.c. § 3681 (1994). 
10. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the origin of the term "Son of Sam" law. 
11. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118-19 (1991). 
12. 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
13. See ill. at 123. 
14. See infra Part I.C.l for a discussion of how various states have amended their 
Son of Sam laws in an effort to ensure their constitutionality. 
15. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8, repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3 
(eff. Jan. 1, 1995). 
16. See ill. ch. 258C (West Supp. 1999). 
17. See infra Part I1I.B for a discussion of the current "Son of Sam" statute pend­
ing in the Massachusetts Legislature. 
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of Sam statute to protect victims, that an effective and constitu­
tional bill is possible, and that the pending legislation meets these 
criteria and thus should be enacted. 
I. SON OF SAM STATUTES 
A. Genesis of the Son of Sam Statute 
The idea of a notoriety-for-profit law came about in 1977. 
During the summer of that year, David Berkowitz ("Berkowitz") 
terrorized New York City with a series of random shootings that 
resulted in six deaths and left seven people severely injured.Is 
Originally referred to by the media as the ".44 Caliber Killer," due 
to the type of weapon he used to commit his crimes, Berkowitz 
quickly became known by a new alias that appeared in a note left at 
a crime scene.19 The note read in part, "I am a monster. I am the 
Son of Sam."20 Soon after his capture, Berkowitz had opportunities 
to profit from his notoriety by selling the rights to his story.21 Not 
surprisingly, the possibility of Berkowitz gaining financially from 
his murders appalled most people.22 Still, the media was willing to 
buy the rights to Berkowitz's recollections and memoirs, suggesting 
that there would be a significant market for the story.23 Conse­
quently, an outraged New York State Legislature24 rushed legisla­
tion through which prohibited Berkowitz, or any other criminal, 
18. See Lee Lescaze, Berkowitz Pleads Guilty in "Son of Sam" Murders, WASH. 
POST, May 9, 1978, at AI. 
19. See Sam Roberts, Criminals, Authors, and Criminal Authors, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 1987, § 7, at 1 (providing background on Berkowitz and the original Son of 
Sam law). 
20. Id. 
21. See In Re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (1979) (indicating that Berkowitz's 
conservator obtained a contract with McGraw-Hill Book Company to publish his story 
with an advance of $250,000 and with estimated royalties to exceed that amount). 
22. See Wade Lambert & Stephen Wermiel, Curbs Upheld on Criminals' Book 
Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1990, at B11 (providing background on New York's Son of 
Sam law). 
23. See Adam R. Tschom, Beyond Son of Sam, 17 VT. L. REv. 321,324 & n.12 
(1992); Kathleen M. Timmons, Note, Natural Born Writers: The Law's Continued An­
noyance with Criminal Authors, 29 GA. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1995); New York Approves 
Bill Revising "Son of Sam" Law, WALL ST. J., July 6,1992, at 17. 
24. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105,108-09 (1991) (quoting Senator Emanuel R. Gold, the notoriety-for­
profit law's author, who wrote: "[i]t is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency 
that an individual ... can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once he is 
captured-while five people are dead, [and] other people were injured as a result of his 
conduct") (citation omitted). 
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from profiting from his or her crime.25 
This unprecedented law created new duties for the Crime Vic­
tims Compensation Board of New York ("Board").26 The Board 
was now responsible for reviewing all contracts entered into by 
criminal defendants and could seize all proceeds earned as a result 
of any re-enactment of the criminal's activities or "thoughts, feel­
ings, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime. "27 As such, any 
contract entered into with a person accused or convicted of a crime 
had to be submitted to the Board for review if it related to the re­
enactment of the crime.28 Under the statute, a person convicted of 
a crime was broadly defined as any individual convicted of a crime 
at trial or following the entry of a plea of guilty, as well as "any 
person who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commis­
sion of a crime for which such person is not prosecuted."29 
Although the statute did not entirely prohibit a criminal from con­
tracting to sell his or her story, the law required that monies related 
to that contract be maintained by the Board in an escrow account, 
and that those monies be distributed to the crime victims when a 
civil judgment was obtained against the criminal defendant.3D 
Crime victims had five years to bring a civil action to recover a 
money judgment against criminal defendants or their represent a­
tives.31 As such, the Board was required to publish legal notices of 
the contracts to potential victims in the county where the crime 
took place every six months for five years.32 
Thus, within a few years of his crimes, the Son of Sam alias was 
associated not only with Berkowitz, but also with a new class of 
statutes-Son of Sam laws.33 Although relatively few crimes can 
command the public attention that Berkowitz's did, making it seem 
unlikely that a Son of Sam law would be necessary,34 a law that 
25. See In Re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 906 ("Section 632-a of the Executive Law 
[was] conceived in haste, written in haste, and' declared under the cry of the public for 
the Legislature to exact retribution ...."). 
26. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 622 (McKinney 1996). 
27. Id. § 632-a(1), repealed by L. 1992, ch. 618, § 10 (eff. July 24, 1992). 
28. See id. 
29. Id. § 632-a(10)(b). 
30. See id. § 632-a(1). 
31. See id. 
32. See id. 
33. Ironically, the statute was never applied to Berkowitz. See Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 111 (1991) 
(stating that Berkowitz was found incompetent to stand trial and, at the time, the New 
York statute only applied to criminals who had actually been convicted). 
34. See id. (noting that the Son of Sam law had been invoked only a handful of 
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combined crime, notoriety, and money was extremely popular with 
both legislators and voters.35 After the creation of the New York 
statute, nearly every state, including Massachusetts, passed similar 
legislation.36 
times); see also Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and Press 
Clauses, 70 N.C. L. REv. 493, 505 & n.73 (1992) (stating that in most jurisdictions 
outside of New York few cases have been brought under "Son of Sam" statutes). 
35. See Orly Nosrati, Note and Comment, Son of Sam Laws: Killing Free Speech 
or Promoting Killer Profits?, 20 WHITTIER L. REv. 949, 952 (1999) (noting popularity 
among state legislatures and the public at large); Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform 
and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the 
Litigation Crisis?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 53, 106 n.259 (1995) (noting popularity among 
the public and state legislatures); Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, Simon and 
Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment 
Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1075,1075-76 (1991) (listing statutes from forty­
three state legislatures and the federal government that dealt with such profits); Angela 
Cartwright, Note, Crime Doesn't Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Profit from a 
Criminal's Story, 55 U. CIN. L. REv., 831, 834 (1987) (noting public outrage). 
36. Son of Sam statutes enacted thus included: ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to 84 
(1991) (enacted in 1979); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (Lexis 1998) (enacted in 1984); 
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4201 to 4202 (West 1989) (enacted in 1978); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1985); CAL. Crv. CODE § 2225 (West 
SUpp. 2000) (effective Sept. 15,1986; operative July 1, 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 24-4.1-201 to 207 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 54-218 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§§ 9101 to 9106 (1995) (enacted in 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West 1996 & 
Supp. 2000) (enacted in 1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to 32 (1997) (enacted in 
1979); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 351-81 to 88 (Lexis 1999) (enacted in 1986); IDAHO 
CODE § 19-5301 (1997) (enacted in 1978); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 145/1 to 14 (en­
acted in 1979 and repealed in 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (West Supp. 1999) 
(enacted in 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 1994) (enacted in 1982); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to 7321 (1992) (enacted in 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 346.165 
(Michie 1997) (enacted in 1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1831 to 1839 (enacted in 
1982 and repealed in 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-E (West Supp. 1999) 
(enacted in 1997); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (enacted in 
1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8 (enacted in 1977 and repealed in 1993 (eff. 
Jan. 1, 1995)); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West 1998) (enacted in 1985); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West Supp. 2000) (enacted in 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-38­
1 to 11 (1994) (enacted in 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (enacted in 1981 and 
repealed in 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-101 to 133 (1999) (enacted in 1977); NEB. 
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1835 to 1840 (Michie 1994) (enacted in 1978); NEV. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 217.265 (enacted in 1981 and repealed in 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-28 to 
33 (West 1986) (enacted in 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie Supp. 1999) 
(enacted in 1983 and effective until July 1, 2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (enacted in 
1977 and repealed in 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01 (1996) (enacted in 1993); 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01 to .06 (West 1997) (enacted in 1984); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West SUpp. 2000) (enacted in 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (Supp. 
1998) (enacted in 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8312 (enacted in 1982 and repealed in 
1995); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-1 to 12 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (enacted in 1983 and ruled 
unconstitutional in its entirety in Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670 (R.1. 1997)); S.c. 
CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1980); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 23A-28A-l to 14 (Michie 1998) (enacted in 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13­
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B. 	 The Fall of the Son of Sam Statute: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board37 
In 1981 publishing giant Simon & Schuster purchased the 
rights to Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family, a book written by a pre­
viously obscure organized crime figure, Henry Hill ("Hill").38 The 
book was published in 1986 and described several crimes commit­
ted by Hill and his associates.39 Wiseguy was a best seller and the 
basis for the hit movie GoodFellas.40 On June 15, 1987, the New 
York Crime Victims Board ("Board") determined that Simon & 
Schuster had improperly failed to tum over the contract which was 
covered under New York's Son of Sam law.41 The Board ordered 
the publisher to release all contractual payments owed to Hill or his 
representatives under the contract and ordered the money held in 
escrow for victims of crimes committed by Hill.42 In addition, the 
Board ordered Hill to tum over the money he had already re­
ceived.43 Simon & Schuster sued the Board in federal court seeking 
a declaration that the New York Son of Sam law violated the First 
Amendment and an injunction barring the statute's enforcement, 
based on the argument that the statute placed an improper financial 
burden on content-based speech.44 
401 to 411 (Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1994) (replacing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to 
208, which was enacted in 1974 and repealed in 1994); TEX. REv. ill. STAT. ANN. art. 
8309-1 (enacted in 1979 and repealed in 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.3 (1999) 
(enacted in 1996) (replacing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5, which was enacted in 1991 
and repealed in 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.19 to .22 (Michie 1995) (enacted in 
199O); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 to 290 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (enacted in 
1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 14-2B-1 to 11 (Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 949.165(2} (West 1996) (enacted in 1983 and effective May 18, 1984); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 1-40-301 to 308 (Lexis 1999) (enacted in 1997). 
Only three states have not passed any type of Son of Sam legislation: New Hamp­
shire, North Carolina, and Vermont. Seven states have repealed their Son of Sam stat­
utes and have not replaced them: Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, 
Rhode Island, and Texas. That leaves 40 states with Son of Sam statutes still on the 
books. 
37. 	 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
38. 	 See id. at 112. 
39. 	 See id. at 112-13. 
40. 	 See id. at 114. 
41. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170,172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
42. 	 See id. at 173. 
43. 	 See id. 
44. See id. As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, a statute is pre­
sumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on 
speakers because of the content of their speech. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 
447 (1991). The Court has consistently held that the financial regulation of speech 
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1. The District and Appellate Court Decisions 
The First Amendment states in pertinent part, "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press 
...."45 To determine whether the statute violated Hill's First 
Amendment rights, the United States District Court for the South­
ern District of New York applied the intermediate scrutiny analysis 
used in United States v. O'Brien,46 and found the statute constitu­
tiona1.47 Consequently, the court upheld the Board's decision.48 
The district court found that a "sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech element [of receiving a profit] 
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."49 
The court reasoned that although the statute made it more difficult 
to publish books in conjunction with criminal sources, it did not 
prohibit such arrangements. 50 The Board's job, according to the 
court, was to review whether the Son of Sam statute applied to cer­
tain contracts, not to decide newsworthiness or educational value.51 
Therefore, any burden on free speech was incidenta1.52 The court 
ruled that, in the end, the statute <;mly affected the non-expressive 
element of the transaction-receiVing a profit.53 The court also 
held that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve the state's inter­
est in compensating crime victims because such an interest did not 
involve suppressing speech, but merely attached the proceeds of 
that speech for the benefit of the victim.54 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reached the same conclusion and affirmed the district 
raises the specter that the government, through content-based burdens, may drive cer­
tain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. See id. at 448-49. 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
46. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien Court held that when speech and non­
speech elements are combined in the same conduct, the First Amendment is not in­
fringed if the government demonstrates (1) that it had the power to enact the law, (2) 
that the law serves a substantial or important governmental interest, (3) that the law is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) that the restriction on speech is 
no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest. See id. at 376-77. 
47. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 724 F. Supp. at 177-79. 
48. See id. at 180 (finding that section 632-a was constitutional under both the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
49. Id. at 178 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376). 
50. See id. at 176 (noting that payment is only delayed, not denied, to the 
criminals) . 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 177. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. at 178-79. 
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court's decision, but for different reasons.55 The appellate court 
found that the statute directly burdened the speech of criminals 
who wanted to sell their stories, therefore making it a content­
based restriction. 56 However, the court found that strict scrutiny, 
and not the O'Brien test, was the correct standard to apply.57 Ac­
cording to the court, "for the State to enforce a content-based ex­
clusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end."58 Nevertheless, the court found that the statute met 
strict scrutiny standards because it was narrowly drawn to satisfy 
the compelling interest of ensuring that criminals do not profit from 
their crimes at the expense of victims.59 Still dissatisfied, Simon & 
Schuster appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
2. The Supreme Court Decision 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' 
decisions and found the New York statute unconstitutional.60 
Although the Court agreed with the Second Circuit Court of Ap­
peals that the strict scrutiny test should apply, it found that the Son 
of Sam statute was not sufficiently narrow to meet this standard.61 
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the New York Son of 
Sam law was a content-based statute which singled out, and there­
fore discriminated against, a specific form of speech-the expres­
sive activity of a wrongdoer.62 Writing for the Court, Justice 
O'Connor stated, "'[r]egulations which permit the Government to 
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be 
tolerated under the First Amendment."'63 Having found that the 
Son of Sam law was a content-based statute, the Court applied the 
strict scrutiny test.64 
First, the Court addressed whether the state met its burden of 
55. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 778 (2d Cir. 1990). 
56. See id. at 781-82. 
57. See id. at 782 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
58. [d. 
59. See id. at 783. 
60. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991). 
61. See id. 
62. See id. at 116. 
63. [d. (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,648-49 (1984)). 
64. See id. at 118. Regardless of whether the speaker was Hill, for telling his 
story, or Simon & Schuster, for publishing it, the Court found that the statute targeted 
content-based speech because "[i]t singles out income derived from expressive activity 
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showing that the statute served a compelling governmental inter­
est-the first prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court agreed 
with the lower courts that New York had two compelling reasons to 
regulate the speech: (1) to make sure victims of crime are compen­
sated from the fruits of a crime and (2) to prevent offenders from 
profiting from their crimes.65 The Court was not persuaded that the 
statute was narrowly drawn to achieve either of these two compel­
ling purposes.66 In fact, the Court found that the statute did not 
meet the strict scrutiny standard because it was significantly over­
inclusive.67 
According to the Court, the New York statute defined "person 
convicted of a crime" too broadly because the definition included 
any person who had voluntarily and intelligently admitted to the 
commission of a crime, even where the person was not in fact ac­
cused of or prosecuted for that crime.68 Second, the statute applied 
to works on any subject, provided that the works expressed the ac­
cused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emo­
tions regarding the person's crime, however tangentially or 
incidentally.69 As a result, the statute would "encompass a poten­
tially very large number of works."70 On these points, the Court 
offered several examples of prominent people who could have been 
affected by this statute, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
Saint Augustine.71 As a result, the Court concluded that the statute 
was over-inclusive, and therefore, not narrowly tailored to achieve 
for a burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed only at works with a 
specified content." Id. 
65. See id. at 118-19. The Court was careful to note, however, that there was no 
compelling interest in "'ensuring that criminals do not profit from storytelling about 
their crimes before their victims have a meaningful opportunity to be compensated for 
their injuries.'" Id. at 119 (citation omitted). As such, the inquiry into whether the 
statute was narrowly tailored must be limited to the compelling interest in compensat­
ing victims. See id. at 120-21. 
66. See id. at 121-23. 
67. See id. at 121. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, stated that the viola­
tion of the First Amendment itself was a full and sufficient reason for holding the stat­
ute unconstitutional. See id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy felt the 
statute was unconstitutional because it was a content-based restriction and that borrow­
ing the compelling interests and narrowly tailoring analysis was "ill-advised." Id. (Ken­
nedy, J., concurring). 
68. See id. at 121; see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982 & 
Supp. 1991). 
69. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 121. 
70. Id. 
71. See id. at 121-22 (finding that other works, such as The Autobiography of 
Malcom X and Henry Thoreau's Civil Disobedience, would have been subjected to New 
York's Son of Sam Law had it been enacted at the time of their publication). 
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the state's compelling governmental interest of compensating crime 
victims from profits of crime.72 
The Court also implied that the statute was under-inclusive be­
cause it compensated victims of crimes only when the offender 
profited from selling his or her story, but not from the offender's 
other assets.73 The Court stated that the Board could not "explain 
why the State should have any greater interest in compensating vic­
tims from the proceeds of such 'storytelling' than from any of the 
criminal's other assets."74 Rather than singling out storytelling, the 
statute might have fared better if it had looked to all forms of assets 
held by the offender.75 
Another flaw in the New York statute identified by the Court 
was that the compelling interest of compensating victims was third 
in priority for payment from the escrow fund.76 The first priority 
was payment for legal representation.77 The second priority was 
payment to the state in subrogation for compensation paid to vic­
tims of the crime.78 Only after those interests had been paid and 
after a civil judgment had been obtained could the victim recover 
from the fund.79 Under this scheme, the Court seemed skeptical 
that the statute's purpose in fact matched the underlying policy of 
compensating victims.80 
Although the Court only directly addressed the New York stat­
ute in Simon & Schuster, after the decision most Son of Sam laws 
were called into question.81 After all, they had been patterned after 
72. See id. at 123. 
73. See id. at 119. 
74. Id. 
75. See id. Justice Blackmun, in a separate opinion, concurred in the result, but 
argued that the Court should explicitly state that the statute was under-inclusive as well 
as over-inclusive. See id. at 123-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
76. See id. at 110. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 123 (stating that while the interest of compensating victims is a 
compelling one, New York's statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve that 
objective). 
81. See Nosrati, supra note 35, at 961; Debra Shields, Note, The Constitutionality 
ofCurrent Crime Victimization Statutes: A Survey, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J., 929, 930-31 (1994) (stating that "[t]he constitutionality of all crime victimiza­
tion statutes has been seriously jeopardized by the Simon & Schuster decision because 
most states had adopted statutes very similar to New York's legislation"); Melissa M. 
Erlemeier, Note, The First Amendment Prevails over Crime Victim Compensation: Si­
mon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 26 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1301, 1309 (1992-1993) (noting that after Simon & Schuster, most 
12 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1 
the same flaws that led to the demise of New York's Son of Sam 
law.82 Thus, in response to Simon & Schuster, several states 
amended or replaced their Son of Sam laws in an effort to make 
them constitutional.83 
C. Towards Constitutionality 
1. Content-Neutral 
Critical to the constitutionality of a Son of Sam statute is the 
statute's content-neutrality. Simon & Schuster provides that a stat­
ute which singles out the speech of criminal authors solely because 
of its content will be subject to strict scrutiny.84 While the Court 
did not specifically address whether a statute that makes no refer­
ence to the proceeds generated by First Amendment activities 
would be considered constitutional, it implied that a statute that did 
not single out speech or place a financial burden on speech may be 
content-neutral85 and thus, might withstand judicial scrutiny.86 It is 
important for a court to find that the statute is content-neutral be­
cause a content-neutral statute only needs to meet the less rigorous 
"intermediate scrutiny" test set forth in United States v. O'Brien.87 
Thus, any future Son of Sam legislation should strive to be content-
states modified their version of New York's Son of Sam law in an effort to satisfy the 
Court's constitutional analysis). 
82. See Kevin S. Reed, Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes and the First Amendment: 
Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL'y 1060, 1060 (1992) ("Simon and Schuster foretells the demise of all of these crimi­
nal anti-profit provisions."); Shields, supra note 81, at 933 (concluding that "forty-one 
out of forty-five current state crime victimization statutes in the country are unconstitu­
tional under Simon and Schuster"). See supra note 36 for a complete list of states that 
enacted Son of Sam statutes in the wake of New York's legislation. 
83. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (Supp. 2000) (amended in 1992, 1994, and 
1995); COLO. REv. STAT § 24-4.1-201 (1991 & Supp. 1999) (amended in 1988 and 1994); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 1994) (amended in 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 
(1992) (amended in 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (transferred to section 854 by 
section 7, ch. 585, Acts 1996) (1996 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632(a) (amended 
in 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8312 (1998) (amended in 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 29-13-403 (Supp. 1999) (amended in 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie 
1995) (amended in 1992). 
84. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 117-18. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discus­
sion of the strict scrutiny test as applied in Simon & Schuster. 
85. Content-neutral speech restrictions are "those that 'are justified without refer­
ence to the content of the regulated speech.'" Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) 
(quoting Virginia Pharrn. Bd. v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 771 (1976)). 
86. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 120-21. 
87. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See supra note 46 for a discussion of the O'Brien test. 
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neutral to receive the benefit of this less rigorous standard of 
review. 
Massachusetts' former statute regarding notoriety-for-profit 
fell within the category of statutes subject to strict scrutiny by virtue 
of its forfeiture provisions. Massachusetts' statute, like New York's 
former Son of Sam statute, was not content-neutral because it re­
quired forfeiture of proceeds earned by a criminal defendant "with 
respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way of movie, book, 
magazine article, radio or television presentation, live entertain­
ment of any kind, or from the expression of such person's thoughts, 
feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime. "88 Many 
other state statutes contained similar forfeiture language.89 For in­
stance, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that its state's Son of 
Sam statute was unconstitutional because the statute's applicability 
was limited solely to expressive activity.90 
Content neutrality may be accomplished by targeting all of the 
offender's assets, rather than just assets related to "story-telling." 
For instance, Iowa has amended its Son of Sam statute for this pur­
pose and now defines "proceeds" as "the fruits of the crime from 
whatever source received."91 Similarly, New York amended its stat­
ute in 1992 to address this concern.92 The new statute removes the 
88. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8, repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3 (eff. 
Jan. 1, 1995). 
89. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 41-9-80 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §12.61.020(a) (Lexis 
1998); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(A) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90­
308(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2225(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000); COLO. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (repealed; replaced with 
§ 24-4.1-201(1.5)(a»; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(a) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (West 1996 & 
Supp. 2000); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-14-31(a)(1) (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 351­
81(2) (Lexis 1999); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 
(West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(a) (1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 
346.165(1) (Michie 1997); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854(a)(5) (1996 & Supp. 1999); 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 780.768(2) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(2) 
(West Supp. 2000) (repealed); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-5 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 53-9-104(d) (1999); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-1836 (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52:4B-28 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(A) (Michie Supp. 1999); OHIO 
REv. CODE ANN. § 2969.02(A) (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (Supp. 1998) 
(repealed); S.c. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 23A-28A-1 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.2(2) (1999); WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West 1996). 
90. See Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 677 (R.I. 1997). 
91. IOWA CODE ANN. § 91O.15(1)(e) (West 1994). 
92. The new statute defines "profits from the crime" as: 
(i) [A]ny property obtained through or income generated from the commis­
sion of a crime of which the defendant was convicted; (ii) any property ob­
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language that specified speech-related activities and subjects all 
crime-related assets to seizure.93 At least one commentator be­
lieves that as a result of these changes, the New York statute now 
complies with Simon & Schuster.94 
Still, changes that create "content-neutrality" may not be 
enough to ensure the constitutionality of a Son of Sam law. The 
Court in Simon & Schuster merely indicated that a statute would be 
more likely to pass constitutional muster if it was content-neutral, 
but it did not state what measures would be required to create a 
content-neutral statute. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that 
"the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [will not] be 
enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on con­
tent."95 Although these new Son of Sam statutes purport to encom­
pass all assets, "storytelling" is still their natural target, and often 
will be the only source of assets for criminals. Therefore, it is of 
course possible that a court would look past new purportedly con­
tent-neutral language and still find a content-based purpose.96 For 
precisely this reason, commentators have emphasized that a Son of 
tained by or income generated from the sale, conversion or exchange of 
proceeds of a crime ... ; and (iii) any property which the defendant obtained 
or income generated as a result of having committed the crime, including any 
assets obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the 
commission of, or in preparation for the commission of, the crime, as well as 
any property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion or 
exchange of such property and any gain realized by such sale, conversion or 
exchange. 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l)(b) (McKinney 1996). 
93. See id. 
94. See Amr F. Amer, Comment, Play It Again Sam: New York's Renewed Effort 
to Enact A "Son of Sam" Law That Passes Constitutional Muster, 14 Loy. L.A. ENT. 
L.J. 115, 133-35 (1993). 
95. Thrner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,642-43 (1994). 
96. Although a statute may be content-neutral because it applies to all crime­
related assets rather than just speech-related activity, the most common way in which a 
criminal profits from his notoriety is through books, film, or television which are pro­
tected activities under the First Amendment. Therefore, the New York Crime Victims 
Board still considers its statute vulnerable to challenge. The statute was challenged in 
1997 when Sammy "The Bull" Gravano sold the rights to his story which resulted in the 
book Underboss. See New York State Crime Victims Bd. v. T.J.M. Prods., Inc., 673 
N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). The parties that contracted with Gravano 
sought to dismiss the complaint brought by the New York Crime Victims Board and the 
case went before the New York Supreme Court. See id. at 872-73. The complaint was 
dismissed, not on constitutional grounds, but rather on the grounds that the statute's 
definition of crime did not include the federal crimes for which Gravano was convicted. 
See id. at 875. Also, the new statute did not prohibit a contracting party from making 
agreements with the representative or assignee of a person charged or convicted of a 
crime. See id. at 877. 
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Sam statute must be narrowly tailored to apply to all of a defend­
ant's crime-related assets.97 
2. Narrowly Tailored Statute 
In addition to being content-neutral, a notoriety-for-profit stat­
ute should be tailored to fulfill the circumscribed purpose of com­
pensating victims.98 This narrow tailoring will allow the statute to 
withstand even strict scrutiny review if a court should find that the 
statute is not content-neutral. Narrow tailoring may be accom­
plished by changing the definitions of to whom and to what the 
statute will apply as reflected in two key terms: "defendant" and 
"profits of crime." 
a. The definition of "defendant" 
When creating a notoriety-for-profit statute, the definition of 
who the statute applies to, typically the "defendant," should be tai­
lored to focus on only those offenders who have an obligation to 
compensate victims. In Simon & Schuster, the Court held that the 
New York statute was not narrowly tailored, in part, because the 
definition of a "person convicted of a crime" was overly broad.99 
The definition allowed the forfeiture of proceeds from anyone ac­
cused of a crime or anyone who voluntarily admitted to the com­
mission of a crime, regardless of whether that person was 
eventually convicted.1°O Several states now have definitions that 
conform to Simon & Schuster's requirements and may provide 
model language for a new Son of Sam statute. 
For example, Minnesota now defines "offender" as a "person 
convicted of a crime or found not guilty of a crime by reason of 
insanity."101 Similarly, Iowa narrowly defines "convicted felon" as 
"a person initially convicted, or found not guilty by reason of in­
97. See Reed, supra note 82, at 1066-68; see also Robert Mazow, Comment, Si­
mon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board: Should the Supreme Court 
Have Invalidated New York's Son of Sam Statute?, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 813, 841-43 
(1994); ErJemeier, supra note 81, at 1331. 
98. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120-21 (1991). 
99. See id. at 121; see supra note 68 and accompanying text for the New York 
statute's definition of a "person convicted of a crime." 
100. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 501 U.S. at 121. For the same reason, Alaska's 
statute is unconstitutional. Alaska defines "offender" as a "person who has committed 
a crime in this state, whether or not the person has been convicted of the crime." 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(e)(1) (Lexis 1998). 
101. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 611A.68(1)(c) (Supp. 2000). 
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sanity ... either by a court or jury trial or by entry of a guilty plea in 
court."102 Since Simon & Schuster, New York, Maryland, and Dela­
ware have also amended their overly broad definitions. New York's 
statute now applies only to those who have committed felonies. 103 
While Maryland still defines "defendant" as an individual charged 
with or convicted of a crime,104 it now requires that any seized 
money be returned to a defendant who is acquitted. lOS The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland has since examined the new statute and has 
not found fault with this new definition.106 
b. Tailoring the term "profits from crime" 
Another problem with the New York statute in Simon & 
Schuster was the statute's overly broad definition of "profits from 
crime."107 The Court found that, as written, the statute included all 
forms of storytelling for profit, even if the work had little to do with 
the offender's crime.108 The Court pointed out the problem by not­
ing a range of classic and contemporary literary works that could 
have been affected by the statute, such as The Confessions of St. 
Augustine, which only tangentially mentions crime.109 One method 
of meeting the narrowly tailored requirement of the strict scrutiny 
test has been to add language to limit what forms of expression may 
102. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(1)(a) (West 1994). 
103. "Crime" is defined as: "any felony defined in the penal law or any other 
chapter of the consolidated laws of the state." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(I)(a) (McKin­
ney 1996). Interestingly, New York seems to have made this definition too narrow. 
Because the definition does not include federal crimes, the New York Supreme Court 
for New York County found that the statute did not apply to publication contracts with 
Sammy Gravano. See New York State Crime Victims Bd. v. T.J.M. Prods. Inc., 673 
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1998). Other states that define "crime" to include only "major" crimes 
such as felonies include: ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13­
4201(1) (West 1989); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2225(b)(I) (West Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (West 
1996 & Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 910.15(1)(c) (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(b) (West Supp. 2000); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(A) (Michie Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(1) 
(1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-402(2) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 
(Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE § 14-2B-3(a) (Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 949.165(1)(a) (West 1996). 
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 854(a)(2) (1996 & Supp. 1999). 
105. See id. § 854(e)(3)(ii). 
106. See Curran v. Price, 638 A.2d 93, 99 (Md. 1994) (declining to address the 
merits of the constitutionality of section 764 (now section 854». 
107. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121 (1991). 
108. See id. at 120-21. 
109. See id. at 121. 
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be reached by the statute. States have taken various approaches to 
narrow the scope of the term "profits of a crime." 
Several states that formerly targeted specific forms of expres­
sion within their Son of Sam laws have since tailored their statutes 
to expressly exclude from the reach of the law works that contain 
only incidental or tangential references to crimes. Virginia, for ex­
ample, amended its statute so that profits from crimes "shall not be 
subject to forfeiture unless an integral part of the work is a depic­
tion or discussion of the defendant's crime or an impression of the 
defendant's thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding such 
crime."110 Kansas has also amended its statute so that only the pro­
ceeds from a work that deals "principally with the crime for which 
the person is accused and convicted" are subject to forfeiture. 1l1 
Limiting language does not, however, necessarily mean that 
the statute will be found constitutional. When Rhode Island's stat­
ute was challenged in 1997, the Rhode Island Attorney General ar­
gued that because the statute only applied to people convicted of 
felonies, the law applied "only to 'significant' commercial exploita­
tions of a crime and that 'a tangential or peripheral reference to a 
prior crime would not trigger [its] provisions."'1l2 However, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that this restriction did not al­
leviate the problem that tangential or incidental references to crime 
were still proscribed by the act.113 Similarly, Maryland amended its 
Son of Sam statute by removing language specific to forms of ex­
pression and by providing that the statute would not apply to a 
work that only "tangentially or incidentally relates to the crime."114 
Presently, Maryland's Son of Sam law targets any profits directly or 
indirectly received from the crime, including, but not limited to, 
First Amendment activities under its definition of "notoriety of 
crimes contract."115 The revised statute was challenged in the 1994 
case Curran v. Price.116 Notwithstanding amendments to the stat­
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie 1995). 
111. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(a) (1992). 
112. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 677 (R.I. 1997) (citation omitted). 
113. See id. (stating that "the act [is] over broad because it affects all expressive 
activity"). 
114. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 854(c)(3) (1996 & Supp. 1999). 
115. See id. § 854(a)(5). See infra note 118 for Maryland's definition of "notori­
ety of crimes contract." 
116. 638 A.2d 93 (Md. 1994). Ronald Price was a high school teacher indicted in 
1993 for sexual abuse of students. See id. at 97. In September 1993, Mr. Price was 
convicted of child sexual abuse and another charge and was sentenced to 26 years im­
prisonment. See id. at 97 n.1. In a news interview, Price stated that he had entered into 
a contract to sell his story. See id. at 97 & n.2. The Maryland Attorney General sought 
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ute intended to make it comply with Simon & Schuster,117 amicus 
for the appellant, the ACLU, argued that the statute was overly 
broad due to the definition of "notoriety of crimes contract" and 
the procedures set forth for review of such contracts by the Attor­
ney General.118 The Attorney General argued, however, that any 
overbreadth problems in the definitions were cured by section 
746(c)(3) because it removed contracts with subject matter only 
tangentially or incidentally crime-related from the scope of the stat­
ute.119 Given that even tangentially or incidentally crime-related 
works would be required to be submitted to the Attorney General 
for review, the question before the Maryland Court of Appeals was 
whether the burden of submission and review was necessary and 
narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest without impermissibly 
burdening speech unrelated to the advancement of that interest.12o 
More specifically, the court questioned whether the procedural 
safeguards were sufficient to justify the state's prior restraint of 
speech.121 The court found that the state, and not the defendant, 
should have the burden of proving that the work falls within the 
an interlocutory injunction requiring Price to turn over the contract along with any 
payments received. See id. The American Civil Liberties Union, appearing as amicus 
curiae, challenged the statute as being "a content-based restriction which sweeps too 
broadly, unconstitutionally burdening speech that is protected by the First Amend­
ment." Id. at 98. Price, while contending that the statute was unconstitutional, put 
forth no legal arguments supporting this contention. See id. 
117. Amendments in 1993 added section 764(c)(2) & (3) [now section 854(c)(2) & 
(3)]. Subsection (c)(2) mandates that the Attorney General give his or her decision 
within 180 days, while subsection (c)(3) states that there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the contract is a notoriety of crimes contract. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 854(c)(2) & (3) (1996 & Supp. 1999). 
118. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 101. A "notoriety of crimes contract" was defined 
in section 764(a)(5) [now section 854(a)(5)] of the Maryland statute as: 
(i) The reenactment of a crime by way of a movie, book, magazine article, 
tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presentation, or live 
entertainment of any kind; (ii) The expression of the defendant's thoughts, 
feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding a crime involving or causing personal 
injury, death, or property loss as a direct result of the crime; or (iii) The pay­
ment or exchange of any money or other consideration or the proceeds or 
profits that directly or indirectly result from a crime, a sentence, or the notori­
ety of a crime or sentence. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 854(a)(5) (1996 & Supp. 1999). The Attorney General's 
review procedures allowed the Attorney General to determine whether a contract qual­
ified as a "notoriety of crimes contract." See Curran, 638 A.2d at 101. 
119. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 101-02; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(3) 
(Supp. 1993) [(now § 854(c)(3) (1996 & Supp. 1999)]. 
120. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 102. 
121. See id. at 102-03. 
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regulatory scheme.122 The burden of proof within the Maryland 
statute, therefore, was on the wrong party. In addition, the defend­
ant's right to seek judicial review of the Attorney General's opin­
ion, which could take up to six months, was an unacceptable time 
frame under federal precedent.123 Thus, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals found that the statute's procedural safeguards were insuffi­
cient to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Although inroads have been made to constructing a Son of 
Sam law that withstands constitutional scrutiny, the experience of 
various states, such as those described above, suggests that many 
obstacles remain. Given that problems will arise whenever a Son of 
Sam law is enacted, not only because of constitutional ramifications 
but also because there are those who oppose such laws on principle, 
one must consider the extent to which a Son of Sam statute is bene­
ficial and necessary to justify the efforts of legislators. 
II. Is A "SON OF SAM" LAW NECESSARY? 
Although popular with the public and lawmakers, the very 
need for a Son of Sam law is often called into question. In light of 
Simon & Schuster, not only does a Son of Sam law present constitu­
tional problems, but because these laws are rarely used, opponents 
wonder if they are even necessary. Furthermore, critics of such 
statutes contend that the general goals of Son of Sam laws may be 
achieved in other ways.124 After considering each of these argu­
122. See id. at 102. The court found that a prior restraint on speech places a 
heavy burden on the state to justify the restraint because '''any system of prior restraint 
of expression ... bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'" Id. 
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). The court pointed out 
that "[a] prior restraint of unprotected speech must include sufficient procedural safe· 
guards to avoid unduly suppressing protected speech." Id. (citing Freedman v. Mary­
land, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)). In Freedman, the Supreme Court set forth procedural 
requirements for prior restraints on speech in a motion picture censorship system. See 
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59. The Court held that the state must bear the burden of 
proving that a film is unprotected expression. See id. at 58. It further held that while 
the state may require advance submission of films, this requirement may not be admin­
istered in such a way as to make the state's decision final; only a procedure requiring a 
judicial determination constitutes a valid restraint. See id. "[T]he procedure must also 
assure a prompt final judicial decision." Id. at 59. The Maryland Court of Appeals 
found section 764's review process in conflict with the Freedman standard. See Curran, 
638 A.2d at 103. 
123. The Freedman Court considered a six month delay until final appellate re­
view of a censorship decision an impermissible delay; the Maryland statute allowed six 
months for review by the Attorney General before the possibility of judicial review, 
which the court likewise found to be a heavy burden. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 103. 
124. See Michelle L. Learned, The Constitutionality of Cashing in on Crime: Free 
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ments, however, it becomes evident that a notoriety-for-profit stat­
ute, such as is embodied in the bill currently pending before the 
Massachusetts Legislature,125 is the best method of protecting vic­
tims in a consistent and clearly defined manner. 
A. Would a Son of Sam Statute Be Used? 
Notoriety-for-profit laws are rarely used since only a small per­
centage of all criminals have sufficient notoriety or a compelling 
enough story to get a book or movie deal. In fact, Son of Sam stat­
utes have been used infrequently in the past.126 Between its enact­
ment in 1977 and its invalidation by the Supreme Court in 1991, the 
New York law was used only a "handful of times."127 The Massa­
chusetts version was used only once, in 1987, when former Medford 
police officer Gerald W. Clemente, Ir. published a book detailing 
his corrupt activities.128 The book, The Cops Are Robbers, was a 
commercial success, and he received offers to make his story into a 
film.129 Clemente did not receive profits from the book, however, 
since the bank he burglarized filed a civil suit and obtained an in­
junction preventing him from receiving royalty payments.130 
With so few criminals capitalizing on their notoriety, it might 
Expression, Free Enterprise and Not-Profit Conditions of Probation, 1 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & ApPELLATE ADVOC. 79, 91-92 (1995) (arguing that recovery through civil ac­
tions is sufficient to compensate victims and avoid the First Amendment problems 
presented by Son of Sam statutes and special probation orders). 
125. See infra Part III.B. 
126. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Vic­
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 111 (1991). 
127. See id. at 111. The cases cited in Simon & Schuster include Jean Harris, the 
convicted killer of "Scarsdale Diet" Doctor Herman Tarnower; Mark David Chapman, 
the man convicted of assassinating John Lennon; and R. Foster Winans, the former Wall 
Street Journal columnist convicted of insider trading. See id. 
128. See Duncan Mansfield, Bill Filed to Limit Criminals' Profits for Crime 
Books, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4, 1987, available in 1987 WL 3188327 (noting 
that after Clemente's book was published in June 1987, state officials were angered 
about the prospect of him receiving profits from the book, and tried to get the Treas­
urer's Office to enforce the state's Son of Sam law. The Treasurer's office said the law 
was too vague. Thereafter, lawmakers filed a bill on November 4, 1987 to strengthen 
the state's Son of Sam law). 
129. See Lawmakers Act to Bar Inmates' Book Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1987, 
at 39 (noting that nine movie companies approached Clemente about acquiring film 
rights to his book). The book did in fact become a made-for-television movie, "Good 
Cops, Bad Cops," which aired on NBC on December 9,1990. See Ron Miller, When the 
Cops Are Robbers, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 1990, at 7. 
130. See Mansfield, supra note 128 (reporting that an attorney for the publisher 
of the book stated that Clemente cannot "personally ... get a distribution of funds" 
until the case is settled, although his profits will not amount to much due to the book's 
limited distribution). 
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seem as though Son of Sam legislation is unnec~ssary in the Com­
monwealth. However, the mere infrequency of the statute's use in 
the past does not provide a valid argument for keeping the statute 
off the books. To the contrary, a Son of Sam statute is necessary to 
prevent a negative image of the criminal justice system. Moreover, 
the growing popularity of the "true crime" industryl3l suggests that 
Son of Sam legislation may be used more frequently than it was in 
the past. 
The cases in which Son of Sam statutes are invoked are typi­
cally high profile, and therefore, have the potential to influence 
public perception of our judicial system. For instance, if offenders 
are free to profit from their victims' misery, the criminal justice sys­
tem may be seen as allowing the commercialization of crimes, 
thereby minimizing the plight of victims. Additionally, the absence 
of a Son of Sam statute may lead the courts to attempt to limit 
criminals from profiting from their crimes, thus leaving the judicial 
system open to criticisms that it is legislating rather than adjudicat­
ing. For example, in Commonwealth v. Power,132 there was no Son 
of Sam statute, and so the court imposed probationary terms that 
would foreclose the offender's ability to profit from her crime by 
entirely prohibiting her from publishing her story.B3 An effective 
notoriety-for-profit statute, had it been available at the time of the 
Power case, would have better safeguarded the public image of the 
criminal justice system without forcing the court to fashion its own 
131. See Elizabeth Jensen & Ellen Groham, Stomping Out TV Violence: A Losing 
Fight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1993, at B1 (commenting on the large amount of prime time 
hours devoted to news magazine shows covering crime and made-for-tv movies about 
crime); Lisa W. Foderaro, Crimes of Passion, Deals of a Lifetime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
1991, § 4, at 6 (citing recent proliferation in true crime industry). 
132. 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995). 
133. The probation contract contained the following provision: 

You, your assignees and your representatives acting on your authority are pro­

hibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or benefit generating 
activity relating to the publication of facts or circumstances pertaining to your 
involvement in the criminal acts for which you stand convicted (including con­
tracting with any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other 
legal entity with respect to the commission and/or reenactment of your crimes, 
by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, 
radio or television presentations, live entertainment of any kind, or from the 
expression of your thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such 
crime). This prohibition includes those events undertaken and experienced by 
you while avoiding apprehension from the authorities. Any action taken by 
you whether by way of execution of power of attorney, creation of corporate 
entities or like action to avoid compliance with this condition of probation will 
be considered a violation of probation conditions. 
Id. at 89. 
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means of protecting the victim.134 
Meanwhile, the "true crime" industry continues to biossom.B5 
More and more books, movies, and television dramas revolve 
around real-life incidents and offenders. Given the public's seem­
ingly insatiable thirst for this type of "entertainment," an effective 
notoriety-for-profit law is needed to counterbalance the negative 
impact of public perception of the criminal justice system. Indeed, 
the burgeoning popularity of notorious crimes as the focus of soci­
ety's entertainment suggests more criminals will have greater op­
portunity to profit from their crimes, thus calling for greater use of 
Son of Sam statutes in the future. Consequently, notwithstanding 
the previously rare usage of Son of Sam statutes, an effective noto­
riety-for-profit law is necessary in the Commonwealth. Such legis­
lation would be unnecessary only if there were other means 
available to prevent criminals from profiting from their wrongdoing 
while simultaneously compensating victims. 
B. 	 Non-Statutory Methods Would Not Be as Effective as a Son 
of Sam Law 
Civil libertarians opposed to the use of notoriety-for-profit 
laws primarily rely on two arguments. The first argument is that 
these laws have a chilling effect on the First Amendment rights of 
criminals.136 Secondly, the general goals of these laws may be ac­
complished through other methods, including probationary require­
ments, restitution orders, and civil actions filed by the victims 
themselves.137 In fact, one could argue that the Power case proves 
that probationary requirements provide a constitutional alternative 
to a statutory framework prohibiting criminals from profiting from 
their crimes.B8 In reality, however, each of these alternatives­
134. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
problems that arose from the probation terms in the Power case. 
135. 	 For a discussion of the escalation of the "true crime" market see supra note 
131. 
136. See Nostrati, supra note 35, at 977,983 (arguing that California's Son of Sam 
law has a chilling effect on speech); Kerry Casey, Note, The Virginia "Son ofSam" Law: 
An Unconstitutional Approach to Victim Compensation, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RIGHTS J. 495 (1993) (arguing that Virginia's law has a chilling effect on speech). 
137. See, e.g., Learned, supra note 124, at 79-93 (questioning the constitutionality 
of special conditions on probation and suggesting that civil judgments adequately pro­
tect victims without implicating the First Amendment). 
138. See id: at 89-90; see also infra notes 147-148 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's ruling that probation terms 
instituted in the Power case did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. 
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civil action, restitution, and probation-have serious flaws that a 
well-written Son of Sam statute could eliminate. 
A civil action brought against an offender may certainly serve 
to compensate a victim. Unfortunately, it is impractical for every 
victim in every case to obtain a civil judgment against an offender's 
assets. Even assuming that an action was successful, an offender 
may not have assets to satisfy a judgment. Of course in some cases, 
such as with Power or Berkowitz, it may be obvious from the time 
of arrest, due to the amount of publicity surrounding the case, that 
an offender could easily sell his or her story and acquire substantial 
assets. However, in many cases the victim may choose not to bring 
a civil action only to find out later, after seeing the movie or reading 
the book, that the offender sold his or her story. One such example 
is the case of Henry Hill, a little-known criminal outside local or­
ganized crime circles until a book about his exploits was published 
and later used as the basis for the movie GoodFellas .139 Thus, be­
cause even an obscure offender needs only a compelling story and a 
willingness to strike it rich in the "true crime" market, a Son of Sam 
law is necessary to ensure that victims will be compensated regard­
less of whether or not it occurs to them to bring a civil action 
against their offenders. Moreover, a victim may not have the re­
sources to bring suit. Consequently, the prospects of a civil action 
cannot adequately protect the interest of compensating victims in 
all cases of "notorious" crimes. 
Similarly, restitution cannot be relied upon to compensate vic­
tims in every instance. Many judges are extremely reluctant to or­
der restitution if they believe it cannot be paid by the criminal, 
especially in situations where the only prospect of restitution is the 
possible future sale of the offender's story.140 A judge may also 
have concerns that a defendant will be compelled to commit an­
other crime to pay their obligations.141 In addition, the loss associ­
ated with most crimes cannot be sufficiently computed. Indeed, it 
may be impossible to place a monetary value on the loss that is 
suffered. Any restitution ordered at sentencing, therefore, is not 
139. See Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Vic­
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 112-14 (1991). 
140. See Lorraine Slavin & David J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box­
The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORD· 
HAM L. REV. 507, 570 (1984) (arguing that victims have a low likelihood of recovering 
compensation in the form of restitution). 
141. See id. 
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only speculative, but may also be considered a token amount to the 
victim. 
Likewise, probationary terms can be used to compensate vic­
tims. Such terms were used in Commonwealth v. Power .142 Power 
plead guilty to two indictments-armed robbery and manslaugh­
ter-for which the judge sentenced her to eight to twelve years im­
prisonment.143 The judge also ordered twenty years probation with 
the special condition attached that Power not profit from her crimes 
or her experiences during the years she avoided apprehension.144 
She was then given the opportunity to rescind her guilty plea, but 
she declined.145 Power later appealed the special condition directly 
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, arguing that the re­
striction imposed a prior restraint on content-based speech, that it 
placed her in jeopardy for the actions of third parties, and that the 
special condition was unconstitutionally vague.146 
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the special condition as 
"reasonably [related] to the goals of sentencing and of probation" 
regardless of whether the condition affected a "preferred" righU47 
The court also noted that the holding of Simon & Schuster was not 
applicable to the case because "[a] special condition of probation is 
not subject to the same rigorous First Amendment scrutiny that is 
employed against a statute of general applicability. The condition 
in the instant case applies only to the defendant and is reasonably 
142. 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995). 
143. See id. at 89. 
144. See id.; see supra note 133 for the specific text of the probation terms set by 
the judge. Like Massachusetts, Utah also gives its judges discretion when setting proba­
tion and parole terms to restrict criminals from profiting financially from their crimes. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-10.5 (1999) (parole); § 77-18-8.5 (probation). These stat­
utes provide, in part: 
[T]he court may place the defendant on probation [or parole] and as a 
condition of probation [or parole], the court may order the defendant to be 
prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or benefit generat­
ing activity relating to the publication of facts or circumstances pertaining to 
the defendant's involvement in the criminal act for which the defendant is 
convicted. 
Id. § 77-18-8.5(1), § 77-18-10.5(1). 
145. See Power, 650 N.E.2d at 89. 
146. See id. at 88. 
147. See id. at 89. In reaching its decision, the court examined chapter 276, sec­
tion 87 of the Massachusetts General Laws which allows a trial court to "place on pro­
bation ... any person before it charged with an offense or a crime for such time and 
upon such conditions as it deems proper . .. after a finding or verdict of guilty." Id. at 
89 (emphasis added). The court also noted the great latitude that judges have in sen­
tencing when their sentences are within the limits of the statute. See id. 
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related to a valid probation purpose."148 Thus, the Supreme Judi­
cial Court upheld the constitutionality of the use of probationary 
terms to limit an offender's ability to profit from his or her crime. 
Nevertheless, probation is not an effective alternative to a Son 
of Sam law. First, probation is not always given; rather, it is within 
the court's discretion to require probation.149 In fact, even in 
clearly notorious cases, it may not be imposed. A compelling exam­
ple is the case of Commonwealth v. Woodward.150 In Woodward, a 
British au pair was convicted of killing a baby in her care.151 Given 
the amount of media attention surrounding the case, the sentencing 
judge, Judge Hiller B. Zobel, must have known that the defendant 
had gained world-wide notoriety and that she was likely to have 
ample opportunity to profit from her notoriety. Nevertheless, 
Judge Zobel chose not impose any profit-related probationary re­
quirements on Woodward.152 She was left free to market her noto­
riety in the United States.153 This was the situation until the family 
of Woodward's victim filed a civil suit in United States District 
Court and obtained a preliminary injunction barring Woodward 
from spending money connected to the sale of her story.154 
148. Id. at 91. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of Simon & Schuster. 
149. See supra note 147 for the text of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 87 (1998), 
which gives the court discretion in imposing probation. 
150. 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998). 
151. See id. at 1281. Woodward was convicted of second degree murder, but the 
sentence was later reduced to involuntary manslaughter. See Corey Goldberg, Massa­
chuseus High Coun Backs Freeing Au Pair in Baby's Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, 
at AI. 
152. See Woodward, 694 N.E.2d at 1300 (Greaney, J. dissenting) ("In his memo­
randum reducing the verdict, the judge does not ... consider imposing on Woodward 
any appropriate terms of probation ...."). 
153. Interestingly, Woodward would have a hard time selling her story in her own 
country because the United Kingdom's Press Complaint Commission Code of Practice 
forbids the paying of money to convicted criminals and their families. See Midgley, 
supra note 4. This is a voluntary code of practice among British newspapers by which 
newspapers do not make payments to criminals or their associates unless their story is 
deemed to be in the public interest. See Talbot, supra note 6. 
154. See Patricia Nealon, U.S. Judge Puts Ban on Woodward's Use ofProfits from 
Case, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 1998, at B2. The preliminary injunction issued by Judge 
William G. Young required Woodward to notify the victim's family and the court if she 
signed any contracts to sell her story and barred her from spending the money. See id. 
Judge Young stated that Woodward's only potential asset was the value of her celebrity. 
See id. According to the judge: 
Whatever their protestations, these parties need each other in the most practi­
cal sense: absent insurance, if [the victim's family] is to have any chance to 
collect [its] expected judgment, Woodward must amass the necessary funds, 
and the only potential source appears to be the same media that all parties 
agree are most morally repugnant. 
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Furthermore, because offenders may not gain fame until their 
story is sold, and a court is not in a position to predict whether an 
offender will become notorious or otherwise have the opportunity 
to benefit financially from his or her crime, victims can not rely on 
Power-type restrictions being placed on the offender during sen­
tencing. In these cases, neither the state nor the victim knows if the 
offender has money-making potential and thus neither is likely to 
seek probationary terms that limit the offender's ability to sell his 
or her story. Consequently, a system that is triggered at the time a 
criminal attempts to sell his or her story is necessary. Such a sys­
tem, as would be imposed by Son of Sam legislation, would serve 
the state's interests regardless of how little or well-known the crimi­
nal was at the time of sentencing. If the criminal proves to be a 
notorious one, his or her victims would be compensated. 
Probation is also deeply flawed as a means of prohibiting a 
criminal from marketing his or her notoriety because a typical pro­
bation order is couched in terms of a broad prohibition on an activ­
ity that does not allow for exceptions. This was true in the Power 
case. As a result of her broad probationary restriction,155 Power 
abstained from publishing anything, regardless of content or com­
pensation, in fear that such a publication might violate her proba­
tion.156 Although Power had indicated that whatever compensation 
she would receive would be shared with the family of her victim,157 
the threat of revocation remained.158 Indeed, the terms of the pro­
bation order prohibited her from making an agreement with her 
victim's family to accomplish this goal.159 For this reason Power's 
own attorney, Rikki Klieman, stated that a statutory scheme may 
be preferable to a condition of probation since it would be more 
Id. 
155. See supra note 133 for the terms of Power's probation. The sweeping nature 
of this order may be seen in the first sentence: "You, your assignees and your repre­
sentatives acting on your authority are prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging 
in any profit or benefit generating activity relating to the publication of facts or circum­
stances pertaining to your involvement in the criminal acts for which you stand con­
victed." Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Mass. 1995). 
156. See, e.g., Jordana Hart, An Inmate's Introspection: Katherine Ann Power 
Talks of Her Life and Her Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 1994, at Bl (stating that 
Power was refusing, at the time of the interview, any book or movie contracts until after 
her appeal of Judge Bank's probation order. The probation order was subsequently 
upheld). 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See supra note 133 for the terms of Power's probation. 
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flexible. 160 Such a scheme would not only allow criminals an oppor­
tunity to market their stories without the fear of serving a prison 
sentence for violating a court order, but would also provide com­
pensation to victims.161 
Based on this analysis, non-statutory alternatives do not ap­
pear to achieve the desired social and policy benefits derived from 
Son of Sam statutes. A Son of Sam statute is therefore necessary to 
ensure that all victims of crime are compensated when a criminal is 
able to profit from his or her crime. 
C. Public Policy Favors Publication by Criminal Offenders 
A consideration which enters into the Son of Sam debate per­
haps more rarely than it should is that criminal offenders should be 
able to publish their life stories, without restriction, for the benefit 
of society. This public policy argument is persuasive even where 
free speech (i.e., First Amendment) rationales are not implicated. 
However, a Son of Sam statute does not have to undermine the 
benefits a society gains when a criminal relates the events that have 
made him or her notorious; rather, a properly drafted statute can 
ensure that this benefit is conferred. 
When a criminal details his experiences, society is benefitted 
because various specialists can gain a greater knowledge of the 
criminal mind and its methods. In particular, law enforcement, 
criminologists, and sociologists often gain a better understanding of 
the offender's life experience.162 This insight may not only be of 
academic interest, but may serve the practical purposes of criminal 
profiling and lead to the earlier apprehension of other criminals.163 
Some critics may contend that Son of Sam legislation discourages 
criminals from relating this information. If a criminal has nothing 
to gain financially from his or her pUblication, then the argument is 
that he or she has no incentive to relate the story and may choose 
not to do so. However, Son of Sam legislation does not always 
eliminate an offender's ability to profit financially from recounting 
his or her story.164 Additionally, offenders might have other mo­
160. See Greater Boston (WGBH television broadcast, Nov. 17,1997). 
161. See id. 
162. See, e.g., JOEL NORRIS, SERIAL KILLERS: THE GROWING MENACE (1988). 
The author of this book interviewed several serial killers, including Henry Lee Lucas, 
Carlton Gary, Bobby Joe Long, Leonard Lake, and Charles Manson, to discern the 
nature and unifying patterns of serial killers. 
163. See id. 
164. Many Son of Sam statutes contain provisions that permit convicted defend­
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tives for publishing their stories, such as recompense or fame. 
Even victims may not object to the offenders' attempts to 
make money from their stories if they too can share in the financial 
benefit. The victim or the victim's family are all too often aware of 
the harsh reality that they can never be made "whole." At the very 
least, they may find some solace in recovering money from the of­
fender to pay medical expenses, lost wages, or loss of support-civil 
remedies that would otherwise be unavailable to victims if the of­
fender was initially without assets, and so victims chose not to pur­
sue civil remedies. 
In light of these policy arguments, a criminal should not be 
wholly prohibited from selling his or her story. Rather, a statute 
should be in place that allows offenders to sell their stories and 
gives them some incentive to do so. A Son of Sam statute that gives 
offenders some ability to gain financially from selling their notori­
ety is one most likely to produce a published story which can bene­
fit both victims and society. 
Notwithstanding the arguments in favor of a Son of Sam law to 
compensate victims, currently there is no Son of Sam law in Massa­
chusetts. However, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office 
has reviewed the case law and state responses to Simon & Schuster 
and in 1999 filed revised notoriety-for-profit bills with the legisla­
ture.165 The proposed law entails various provisions designed to 
meet the needs of crime victims in Massachusetts in an effective and 
constitutional manner. 
ants to recover a percentage of any monies received because of their notoriety if there 
are no pending judgments against them after a specified period of time. These state 
statutes include: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) 
(100% after five years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(c) (1995) (100% after five 
years); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(d) (1997) (100% after five years); HAW. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 351-88 (Lexis 1999) (100% after ten years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(8) (West 
1994) (100% after five years); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854(e)(3)-(4) (1996 & Supp. 
1999) (100% after five years); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-9(4) (1994) (court order deter­
mines how much money should go to the support of minor dependents); NEB. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 81-1837 (Michie 1994) (100% after five years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22­
22(F) (Michie Supp. 1999) (100% after five years); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2969.05 
(West 1997) (100% after three years); OR. REv. STAT. § 147.275(6) (Supp. 1998) (100% 
after five years); s.c. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999) (100% after five 
years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28A-8 (Michie 1998) (100% after five years); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 29-13-407(a)(1) (Supp. 1999) (100% after three years); WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 7.68.240 (West 1992) (50% after five years); W. VA. CODE § 14-2B-7(d) 
(Supp. 1999) (100% after three years); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(8)(b) (West 1996) 
(100% after three years). 
165. See S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999), amended and reintroduced as 
S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). 
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III. 	 CREATING A CONSTITUTIONAL SON OF SAM LAW 
FOR MASSACHUSE'ITS 
The statute which contained the previous Son of Sam law, 
chapter 258A of the Massachusetts General Laws, was repealed in 
1994166 to make way for the new Compensation of Victims of Vio­
lent Crime Act.167 The new statute, however, did not include a re­
placement notoriety-for-profit section.168 Presumably, this was 
because the legislature knew that due to Simon & Schuster, the Son 
of Sam statute as written was unconstitutional, and that a com­
pletely different piece of legislation would have to be drafted. The 
legislature may have expected a replacement bill to have been 
drafted and passed into law before the January 1, 1995 repeal date 
for chapter 258A. Indeed, a proposed Son of Sam law was filed by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 1994169 and 1995170 ses­
sions of the legislature. Those bills, however, were based largely on 
the former New York statute and were believed to contain many 
potential constitutional problems. l7l In response, the Attorney 
General's Office ("AGO"), in conjunction with Massachusetts Of­
fice of Victim Assistance ("MOVA"), undertook a comprehensive 
analysis of Simon & Schuster and reviewed how other states had 
revised their Son of Sam statutes in order to draft a suitable Son of 
Sam statute for Massachusetts. Although the first bill proposed by 
the AGO proved unsuccessful,l72 the AGO amended the bill and 
introduced revised versions in 1999.173 
A. Senate Bill 852: "An Act Relative to the Profits from Crime" 
The MOVA board approved a notoriety-for-profit bill in late 
166. Chapter 258A was repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3, effective Jan. 1, 1995. 
See MAss. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 258A (West Supp. 1999). 
167. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258C, §§ 1-13 (1998). This act created the "Victim 
Bill of Rights" and reorganized the Attorney General's Office's Victim Compensation 
Division and the process by which victims obtain financial relief from the state for their 
crime-related injuries and lost wages. 
168. See id. 
169. See S. 752, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1994). 
170. See S. 878, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1995). 
171. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the flaws the Supreme Court found in 
New York's Son of Sam statute that led to its determination that the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
172. See S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). 
173. See S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass 1999) (amended and reintroduced as 
S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999». The revised version of S. 804 was intro­
duced on August 9, 1999. It retained all of the language found in S. 804, but added a 
second section to the amendment. See infra note 190 for the language added to S. 1950. 
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1996. This bill, titled "An Act Relative to Profits from Crime," was 
filed with the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 1997 session 
as Senate Bill 852.174 The bill required a party who contracted with 
a criminal offender to submit a copy of the contract or a summary 
of the terms of an oral agreement to the Division of Victim Com­
pensation and Assistance ("Victim Compensation Division") within 
thirty days.175 The contracting party was also obligated to remit to 
the Victim Compensation Division any money or consideration 
owed to the offender as a result of the agreement.n6 If a party did 
not comply, the bill specified significant civil penalties.n7 The 
money remitted to the Victim Compensation Division would then 
be placed in an escrow fund. 178 After the account was established, 
the Victim Compensation Division had thirty days to determine 
whether the contract included proceeds of the crime and whether 
the proceeds were "substantially related to the crime."179 The bill 
further required the Victim Compensation Division to notify vic­
tims of the existence of a contract with an offender either by certi­
fied mail or advertisements in local publications. ISO This notice was 
174. S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). The primary sponsor of Senate 
Bill 852 was the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, William R. Keating. See 
id. 
175. Seeid. §14(b). 
176. See id. 
177. See id. § 14(c). If the contracting party failed to adhere to section 14(b), 
then the Division of Victim Compensation and Assistance was authorized to petition 
the superior court for an order of enforcement. See id. If the court found that a con­
tracting party had in fact violated subsection (b): 
[T]he court shall, in addition to any other relief, impose on the contracting 
party a civil penalty of the value of the contract or agreement. If the court 
finds such violation to have been knowing or willful, it shall impose a civil 
penalty up to three, but not less than two, times the value of the contract or 
agreement. 
Id. 
178. See id. § 14(f). Upon a determination that a defendant had entered into a 
contract agreement to receive proceeds substantially related to a crime for which he or 
she had been charged or convicted (under section 14(e», the Victim Compensation 
Division was authorized to "place into escrow all monies or other consideration remit­
ted by the contracting party, up to the amount determined by the division to constitute" 
proceeds from the crime. See id. (emphasis added). Any remaining monies or consid­
eration were to be returned to the contracting party. See id. 
179. Seeid. §14(e). 
180. See id. § 14(d). The Victim Compensation Division had to send notification 
by certified mail to the victim's last known address. See id. The Victim Compensation 
Division also had to "provide legal notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
county in which the crime was committed ...." Id. The Victim Compensation Division 
was required to publish such a notice once every six months for one year from the date 
it received the contract agreement paying a defendant money. See id. Thereafter, the 
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designed to give victims another opportunity to bring a civil action 
against criminal offenders.181 Judgments against the criminal of­
fender would be satisfied from the escrow account,182 and any re­
maining funds would be split between the defendant and the 
Witness Assistance Fund.183 
Although this bill retained the escrow account mechanism 
common in the pre-Simon & Schuster laws,184 it included several 
safeguards that were intended to cure the constitutional defects 
identified in Simon & Schuster. These safeguards included a provi­
sion that limited the types of crimes that would trigger the law to 
felonies185 and a requirement that the law would only apply to pro­
ceeds that arose from activities that were "substantially related" to 
the crime for which the defendant was charged or convicted.186 
Senate Bill 852 was approved by the Judiciary Committee after 
a public hearing during the spring of 1997 and was referred to the 
Senate Ways and Means Committee.187 There was a renewed inter­
est in notoriety-for-profits laws during November and December 
1997, due to the conviction and sentencing of Louise Woodward in 
the Middlesex Superior Court.188 As speculation mounted that 
Woodward was going to sell her story to an American publisher or 
media outlet, Attorney General Harshbarger wrote to Senate Ways 
and Means Chairman Stanley Rosenberg urging him to take action 
on Senate Bill 852.189 
However, members of the Senate Ways and Means Committee, 
including Chairman Rosenberg, were concerned that Senate Bill 
852 infringed upon criminals' rights to publish their stories and ex­
periences. Furthermore, members of the Ways and Means Com­
mittee were mindful that having money held in escrow for 
Victim Compensation Division could provide additional notice as it deemed necessary. 
See id. 
181. See id. § 14(g). Subsection (g) gave victims three years from the time of the 
last published public notice to bring civil action against a defendant for money damages. 
See id. 
182. See id. § 14(f). 
183. See id. § 140). 
184. See id. § 14(f). 
185. See id. § 14(a). 
186. See id. § 14(e). 
187. See S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). 
188. See, e.g., Letter from Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachu­
setts, to Senator Stanley Rosenberg, Chairman, Senate Ways and Means Committee 
(Nov. 13, 1997) (on file with the Western New England Law Review) (discussing S. 852) 
[hereinafter Letter]; Greater Boston (WGBH television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1997). 
189. See, e.g., Letter, supra note 188. 
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potentially many years might be considered too intrusive. Finally, 
the Senate Ways and Means Committee expressed concerns about 
the review process for determining what property could be seized. 
These concerns mirrored the objections of Howard Kaplan 
("Kaplan"), Chairman of the Trustees of the Civil Liberties Union 
of Massachusetts Foundation ("CLUM"), who met with Attorney 
General Harshbarger on November 26, 1997, and expressed 
CLUM's opposition to any type of criminal profits law. Although 
the Attorney General countered that a properly crafted bill could 
provide important protection for victims without infringing on First 
Amendment rights, in light of the constitutional concerns, the Sen­
ate Ways and Means Committee ultimately did not bring Senate 
Bill 852 to a vote during the legislative session that ended in June 
1998. 
The Senate Ways and Means Committee's objections 
prompted further review of Senate Bill 852 by members of the 
AGO in an attempt to strengthen the bill's safeguards regarding 
free speech and property rights. As a result of this examination, the 
Attorney General proposed several substantive changes to Senate 
Bill 852.190 Most importantly, the escrow account scheme was dis­
carded in favor of a system in which a party who contracts with a 
criminal would be responsible for posting a bond for "proceeds" 
owed to the criminal.191 Secondly, provisions that mandate an ad­
ministrative hearing were added to give a contracting party a 
greater opportunity to dispute the findings of the Victim Compen­
sation Division.192 Finally, "substantially related to a crime" was 
more fully defined within the body of the bill.193 The result is a 
190. See S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass 1999). This new Son of Sam Amend­
ment was introduced on January 6, 1999 by Senator Cheryl A. Jacques. See id. A re­
vised version of this amendment was introduced by the Committee on the Judiciary on 
August 9, 1999. See S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). The revised version of 
the amendment retained all of the language pertaining to section 14 from the January 
1999 version. It added, however, a second section to the amendment, which states: 
Section 2A of Chapter 260 of the General Laws is hereby amended by adding 
after the first sentence the following language: "Actions for torts against a 
criminal defendant by his victim as defined by Section 14 of Chapter 258C 
shall be tolled during any period of incarceration, parole, or probation of the 
defendant for the crime committed against the victim." 
Id. § 2. 
191. See S. 1950, § 14(c), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass 1999). 
192. See id. § 14(k). Under this subsection, a contracting party has fifteen days 
from the date of the mailing of the notice to appeal to the Attorney General. See id. 
Thereafter, the Attorney General must cause the Victim Compensation Division to 
hold a public hearing on the Victim Compensation Division's action. See id. 
193. See id. § 14(g). An activity is "substantially related to a crime" if: 
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piece of legislation that attempts to address the constitutional con­
cerns of CLUM and the Senate Ways and Means Committee. The 
new proposal is Senate Bill 1950 and is currently pending in the 
Massachusetts Legislature. 
B. Senate Bill 1950: A New Proposal 
With significant changes made to address the concerns of the 
Massachusetts Legislature as well as those of the United States 
Supreme Court as expressed in Simon & Schuster, a new Son of 
Sam bill, Senate Bill 804, was filed in December 1998.194 This bill 
was amended and reintroduced as Senate Bill 1950 in August 
1999.195 The new proposal should be upheld on constitutional 
grounds because it is both content-neutral and narrowly tailored to 
meet the specific purpose of compensating victims. 
The proposed legislation would be incorporated into the Vic­
tim Compensation statute and would place control over notoriety­
for-profit cases with the AGO's Division of Victim Compensation 
and Assistance ("Victim Compensation Division") which adminis­
ters the Victim of Violent Crimes Fund.196 This legislatively created 
fund provides awards of up to $25,000 to compensate victims of vio­
lent crimes for related burial expenses, medical bills, and lost 
wages.197 This program is largely funded through assessments 
against offenders who plead or are found guilty of a crime or admit 
to sufficient facts for a guilty finding in the district or superior 
courtS.198 With a legal staff available to file injunctions, attach­
ments, and restraining orders necessary to enforce the statute's pro­
[I]t principally derives from the unique knowledge or notoriety acquired by 
means and in consequence of the commission of a crime for which the defend­
ant has been charged or convicted, or which the defendant has voluntarily 
admitted. Activity that is tangentially related to a crime, or that contains only 
a passing inference to a crime, shall not be determined to be substantially 
related. 
[d. 
194. S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). 
195. S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). See supra note 190 for a discus­
sion of S. 1950. 
196. See id. § 14(a). Past Son of Sam bills have placed responsibility for regulat­
ing notoriety-for-profit actions with the Massachusetts Office of Victim Assistance 
("MOVA"). See, e.g., S. 878, § 8(a), 179th Leg., 1st Annual Sess. (Mass. 1995). Section 
8(a) defined "board" as "the Victim and Witness Assistance Board as established in 
section four of Chapter two hundred and fifty eight B of the General Laws." See id. 
197. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258C, § 3 (1998). 
198. See id. ch. 258B, § 8. The amounts assessed are $35 for a misdemeanor and 
not less than $60 for a felony if the offender is an adult. See id. If the offender is 
adjudicated a delinquent child, the amount assessed is $30. See id. This money goes to 
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visions, the Victim Compensation Division is in the best position to 
regulate notoriety-for-profit cases and to identify the victims of the 
related crime. Moreover, placement of the notoriety-for-profit pro­
vision within a larger statute which, by its terms, is clearly designed 
to compensate victims of crime, demonstrates that the primary goal 
of the new law is to compensate the victims of crime, as opposed to 
limiting the speech of criminals or regulating speech that relates 
criminals' stories. 
The proposed legislation would be triggered whenever a per­
son or business, termed the "contracting party,"199 contracts with or 
agrees to pay a "defendant" who is attempting to profit from past 
criminal activity. A "defendant" would include those people who 
have been charged with or convicted of a crime or who have volun­
tarily admitted to the commission of a crime.2OO In contrast to pre­
vious under-inclusive laws that specifically targeted storytelling, the 
proposed legislation includes profits gained from any use of the de­
fendant's notoriety or unique knowledge gained from committing a 
crime.201 The proposed legislation's reach, however, avoids being 
the Massachusetts Victim and Witness Assistance Fund. See id. Such funds are also 
available to prosecutors' offices to fund victim and witness advocacy programs. See id. 
199. Senate Bill 1950 defines a "contracting party" as "any person, firm, corpora­
tion, partnership, association or other private legal entity which contracts for, pays, or 
agrees to pay a defendant consideration which it knows or reasonably should know may 
constitute proceeds from a crime." S. 1950, § 14(a). This language differs from the 
earlier version, Senate Bill 852, in that "private" is inserted before "legal entity" to 
exclude situations where law enforcement or the government deem it necessary to enter 
into an agreement with a defendant. See S. 852, § 14(a), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 
1997). 
200. See S. 1950, § 14(a). The proposed bill defines "defendant" as "a person 
who has been charged with or convicted of a crime, or has voluntarily admitted the 
commission of a crime." Id. This definition differs from Senate Bill 852 in that it in­
cludes voluntary admissions in an effort to expand the number of criminal offenders 
covered by the bill. See S. 852, § 14(a). The drafters were concerned with the possibil­
ity that a defendant who has gained notoriety from some crimes could exploit crimes he 
or she was not charged with or that could not be charged due to a statute of limitations 
or grant of immunity. Thus, the proposed legislation defines "conviction" as: 
[A] finding or verdict of guilty or of not guilty by reason of insanity, a plea of 
guilty or a finding of sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty whether or 
not final judgment or sentence is imposed, or an adjudication of delinquency 
or of youthful offender status as defined in section 52 of Chapter 119. 
S. 1950, § 14(a). 
201. See S. 1950, § 14(a). The proposed bill defines "proceeds of the crime" as: 
[A]ny assets, material objects, monies, and property obtained through the use 
of unique knowledge or notoriety acquired by means and in consequence of 
the commission of a crime from whatever source received by or owing to a 
defendant or his representative whether earned, accrued, or paid before or 
after the disposition of criminal charges against the defendant. 
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over-inclusive by targeting only those defendants who have been 
charged with, convicted of, or who have admitted to committing a 
felony.202 This change meets the Supreme Court's mandate to nar­
rowly tailor a Son of Sam statute by limiting its scope to people who 
have committed major crimes.203 While optimistic that Senate Bill 
1950 would survive constitutional scrutiny, the AGO also included 
additional provisions to ensure its effectiveness. 
1. The Reporting Requirement 
The AGO has taken the position that an effective reporting 
requirement is essential to any notoriety-for-profit law.204 Not only 
does a reporting requirement serve to notify victims, but it permits 
the AGO to monitor any action taken by either the contracting 
party or the defendant to circumvent the law. The proposed legisla­
tion mandates that the contracting party,2°5 rather than the defend­
ant, submit to the Victim Compensation Division a copy of the 
contract or a summary of the terms of an oral agreement within 
Id. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the Supreme Court's discussion of under­
exclusivity pertaining to New York's Son of Sam statute. 
202. See S. 1950, § 14(a). The proposed bill defines "crime" from which the de­
fendant has gained his notoriety as: 
[A]ny violation of Massachusetts law that is punishable by imprisonment in 
state prison and any federal offense committed in the Commonwealth that is 
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of more than one year. 
Crime shall also include any offense committed by a juvenile which would be a 
crime if the juvenile were an adult. 
Id. This definition parallels the definition of "felony" in chapter 90F of the Massachu­
setts General Laws. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the Supreme Court's discus­
sion of New York's Son of Sam statute's over-inclusive language. 
203. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the narrow tailoring requirement 
established by the Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster. By contrast, the previous Mas­
sachusetts Son of Sam statute included all crimes. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258A, 
§ 8, repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995). The definition for crime was "an 
act committed by an adult or a juvenile in the Commonwealth which, if committed by a 
mentally competent criminally responsible adult ... would constitute a crime ...." [d. 
Other states have also limited the scope of their Son of Sam statutes to felonies. See, 
e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(a) (McKinney 1996) (defining "crime" as "any felony 
defined in the penal law"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.10(5) (West Supp. 1999) (defining 
"violent crime" as "a forcible felony ... includ[ing] any other felony or aggravated mis­
demeanor which involved the actual or threatened infliction of physical or emotional 
injury"). See supra note 103 for a description of other states that have similarly limited 
the scope of their statutes. 
204. Letter from Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, to Sena­
tor William Keating and Representative John Rogers (May 2, 1997) (on file with the 
Western New England Law Review) (discussing Senate Bill 852). 
205. For a discussion of the argument that placing the burden on the defendant to 
report possible profits from selling his story might force a defendant to bear witness 
against himself, see Curran v. Price, 638 A.2d 93, 106-07 (Md. 1994). 
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thirty days of its execution.206 The bill further empowers the Victim 
Compensation Division to prevent any wasting of assets. Specifi­
cally, the Victim Compensation Division may act on behalf of vic­
tims through attachment, injunction, receivership and notice of 
pendency.207 
Another provision essential to an effective notoriety-for-profit 
law is a clear and significant penalty for contracting parties who do 
not fully report their deals with criminal offenders. If a Son of Sam 
law is ignored and monies are turned over to the offender, the 
money is often unrecoverable. Therefore, it is important that a Son 
of Sam statute prevent such activity before it takes place. The ab­
sence of a non-compliance penalty was seen as a flaw of the former 
Massachusetts Son of Sam law and has also been addressed by 
other states.208 The proposed legislation seeks to eliminate this 
concern by providing that the Attorney General's Office may seek 
an order for enforcement in the superior court.209 Furthermore, a 
206. See S. 1950, § 14(b). This subsection proposes: 

Any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity 

which contracts for, pays, or agrees to pay a defendant consideration which it 

knows or reasonably should know may constitute proceeds of a crime shall, 

within thirty days of the agreement, submit to the division a copy of its con­
tract or a summary of the terms of any oral agreement. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
207. See S. 1950, § 14(p). This subsection proposes: "The division, acting on be­
half of any victim, shall have the right to apply for any and all provisional remedies, 
available under civil practice law and rules, including, but not limited to, attachment, 
injunction, receivership and notice of pendency." Id. 
208. For example, the revised statutes in New York, Kansas, and Colorado may 
all be deficient in that they fail to provide penalties and remedies to enforce their provi­
sions. See., e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201 to 207 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 to 7321 (1992); N.Y. EXEC. LAWS § 632-a (McKinney 1996). 
Several states have made failure to comply with their statute's notice and payment pro­
visions either a felony or a misdemeanor. See., e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991) (fel­
ony); CAL. Civ. CODE § 2225(g) (West Supp. 2000) (contempt); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 9106 (1995) (misdemeanor); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-32 (1997) (misdemeanor); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(8)(a) (West SUpp. 2000) (gross misdemeanor); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 99-38-11(2) (1994) (misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(7) 
(1996) (misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(A) (West Supp. 2000) (felony); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-410 (Supp. 1999) (misdemeanor); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 949.165(14) (West 1996) (misdemeanor). Other states have chosen to enforce their 
statutes' notice provisions with civil penalties. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13­
4202(L) (West 1989) (fine); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 351-87 (Lexis 1999) (lien); Ky. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 346.165(6) (Michie 1997) (lien); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854(0) 
(1996 & Supp. 1999) (fine); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(A) (West Supp. 2000) (fine); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8312(g) (West 1998) (fine); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-410 
(Supp. 1999) (fine); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(14) (West 1996) (fine). 
209. See S. 1950, § 14(d). This subsection proposes: 

If the provisions of subsections (b) or (c) are violated, the division may peti­
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civil penalty may be assessed against non-complying contracting 
parties equal to the value of the contract.2lO In cases where the 
court finds that the violation was "knowing and willful," the penalty 
may be two or three times the value of the contract.211 The size of 
the potential fine should be an incentive for publishers or other 
contracting parties to disclose contracts and agreements which may 
be covered by the statute. Additionally, civil penalties that are col­
lected will benefit victims by being deposited in the Victim Com­
pensation Fund.212 
Thus, the advantages of the bill's mandated full disclosure pro­
. vision are twofold. The bill, if passed, will cast a wide enough net to 
reach all parties who attempt to benefit from a crime without being 
mindful of the victims of that crime, while allowing the Common­
wealth to pass on to victims as much information as possible. By 
notifying both the Victim Compensation Division and victims of the 
contract terms, the offender's profits may be reached through a 
court action before they are distributed and lost. 
2. Notification 
The notification requirement,213 which gives victims the infor­
tion the superior court for an order of enforcement. Such action shall be 
brought in the county in which the contracting party resides or has his princi­
ple place of business, or in Suffolk County if the contracting party does not 
reside or have a principal place of business in the commonwealth. Upon a 
finding that a contracting party has violated either subsections (b) or (c) the 
court shall, in addition to any other relief, impose on the contracting party a 
civil penalty of the value of the contract or agreement. If the court finds such 
violation to have been knowing or willful, it shall impose a civil penalty up to 
three, but not less than two, times the value of the contract or agreement. To 
the extent monies or other consideration received by the division as a result of 
such order exceed the value of the contract or agreement, they shall be depos­
ited into the victim compensation fund maintained by the treasurer in accord­
ance with section 4(c). Any remaining monies or consideration shall be held 
by the division pending the determinations required by subsection (g). 
Id. 
210. See id. 
211. See id. 
212. See id. § 14(0). Subsection (0) proposes: 
After all civil claims instituted by victims against the defendant have been 
satisfied, or after three years of publication, if no claims have been filed, one­
half of the value of the bond required in subsections (c) and (i) shall be re­
turned to the contracting party. The remaining portion of the bond shall be 
deposited into the victim compensation fund maintained by the treasurer in 
accordance with section 4(c). 
Id. 
213. See id. § 14(e). This section requires that the Victim Compensation Division 
notify victims by certified mail and publicize the existence of proceeds in a newspaper 
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mation needed to protect their interests, is one of the most impor­
tant provisions of the proposed legislation. Regardless of whether 
the Victim Compensation Division determines that the money qual­
ifies as "substantially related" proceeds,214 the victims may take ac­
tion on their own to reach the proceeds.215 The proposed 
legislation provides victims a better chance to protect their rights by 
giving victims early notice and complete information. 
The proposed legislation mandates that the Victim Compensa­
tion Division take reasonable steps to notify victims of the existence 
of a contract to pay an offender.216 If the offender's victims are 
known, notification must be made by certified mail,217 If the iden­
tity or location of victims is not known, the Victim Compensation 
Division must also place notices in newspapers in the county or 
counties where the crimes occurred.218 These legal notices must be 
made every six months for one year, but may continue as long as 
the Victim Compensation Division deems appropriate.219 
3. Posting a Bond 
After the Victim Compensation Division has obtained the con­
tract or agreement from a contracting party, the contracting party 
must file a bond with the Commonwealth.220 The Victim Compen­
sation Division then must determine what part of the contract, if 
any, is actually burdened by the bond requirement,221 This deter­
mination consists of a two-part process. First, the Victim Compen­
sation Division must determine whether the contract includes 
"proceeds"; that is, whether the money or assets involved in the 
contract are the result of the use of knowledge or notoriety ac­
quired by the commission of a crime.222 Second, the Victim Com­
of general circulation in the county where the crime was committed-twice in the first 
year after it receives the contract or agreement and thereafter as it sees fit. See id. 
214. See id. § 14(g). See supra note 193 for the text of subsection (g). 
215. See id. § 14(f). This section provides that victims have three years, from the 
date of the last mandatory published public notice, to file a civil action to recover 
money damages from a defendant. See id. 
216. See id. § 14(e). 
217. See id. Notification must be made by certified mail to a victim's last known 
address. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. § 14(c). This bond must be "equal in amount to any proceeds of the 
crime which by the terms of the contract would otherwise be owing to a defendant." Id. 
221. See id. § 14(g). 
222. See id. "Proceeds of the crime" is defined in section 14(a). See supra note 
201 for the text of the definition of "proceeds of the crime." 
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pensation Division must determine whether the proceeds are 
"substantially related" to the crime.223 Whereas "proceeds" is a 
broad standard, a determination of what is "substantially related" 
narrows what will be withheld from the defendant and addresses 
the overbreadth problems identified by the Supreme Court in Si­
mon & Schuster.224 
Although the previous legislative proposal, Senate Bill 852, 
mandated that the Victim Compensation Division determine which 
contracts with criminal offenders were substantially related to the 
crime for which they had been charged or convicted, it failed to 
define "substantially related."225 Under the terms of the new bill, 
an activity is "substantially related" if it "principally derives from 
the unique knowledge or notoriety acquired ... [ from] the commis­
sion of a crime for which the defendant has been charged or con­
victed, or ... has voluntarily admitted."226 The bill further states 
that an activity is not substantially related if it is only tangentially 
related, or contains only a passing reference, to the crime.227 The 
purpose of this more detailed definition is for the proposed law to 
avoid the trap of reaching work that relates to a crime in only a 
remote way.228 
The new statute requires the Victim Compensation Division to 
determine whether to invoke the statute within thirty days of re­
ceipt of the contract, again so as not to overly burden the con­
tracting party's nor the offender's rights to free speech and 
contract.229 Under the proposed law, the Victim Compensation Di­
vision is authorized to issue written civil investigative demands for 
information to assist it in expeditiously making this deterrnina­
223. See id. See supra note 193 for the text of the definition of "substantially 
related." 
224. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of how the Simon & Schuster Court 
characterized the over-breadth problem. 
225. See S. 852, § 14(e), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). 
226. S. 1950, § 14(g). 
227. See id. 
228. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's finding that 
over-inclusive language invalidates forfeiture statutes. 
229. See S. 1950, § 14(g). This subsection proposes: 
Within thirty days from the receipt of a contract or agreement, or upon its own 
initiative if no contract or agreement is submitted, the division shall determine 
whether the terms of the contract or agreement include proceeds of a crime as 
defined in subsection (a) and, if so, whether such proceeds arise from activity 
that is substantially related to a crime. 
Id. 
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tion.230 Once the Victim Compensation Division has determined 
that all or a portion of the proceeds are substantially related to a 
felony, and therefore subject to the statute, the contracting party is 
notified and may be required to post a new bond.231 The bond es­
tablishes a fund which preserves the money that could potentially 
be obtained by a victim through a civil judgment,232 while avoiding 
the more cumbersome and intrusive escrow account procedures of 
the former proposed statute.233 
4. Administrative Review 
Another significant change from Senate Bill 852 is the addition 
of an explicit procedure by which a contracting party may have the 
Victim Compensation Division's decision reviewed.234 After being 
notified of the Victim Compensation Division's decision,235 an ag­
grieved contracting party has fifteen days to appeal for review by 
the Attorney General, which includes a public hearing.236 The re­
230. See id. § 14(h). Subsection 14(h) proposes: 
In order to make the determinations required by subsection (g) the division 
shall be authorized to issue written civil investigative demands which may be 
served by certified mail, and which shall be returned within fifteen days from 
the date of service. Whenever a person fails to comply with a civil investiga­
tive demand served on him pursuant to this section, the division may petition 
the superior court for an order of enforcement. Such action shall be brought 
in the county in which the party resides or has his principal place of business, 
or in Suffolk County if the party does not reside or have a principal place of 
business in the commonwealth. Failure to comply with an order entered under 
this section shall be punished as a contempt of court. All information col­
lected by the division pursuant to this section shall be kept in accordance with 
the provisions of chapters 4, 66, and 66A. 
Id. 
231. See id. § 14(i). Subsection 14(i) proposes: 

Upon making the determinations required by subsection (g), the Division may 

continue to hold the bond filed in accordance with subsection (c), or may re­

quire the contracting party to file a new bond equal to the amount determined 

by the Division to constitute proceeds arising from activity that is substantially 

related to a crime. 

Id. 
232. See id. "The bond held by the Division shall be used to satisfy, in part or in 
full, any civil judgment obtained by a victim against the defendant arising from the 
crime." Id. 
233. See, e.g., S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). 
234. See S. 1950, § 14(k) - (T). 
235. See id. § 14(j). This subsection proposes: "Within fifteen days of the deter­
mination required by subsection (g), the division shall notify the contracting party of its 
determinations by certified mail." Id. 
236. See id. § 14(k). This subsection proposes: 

Within fifteen days of the date of mailing of the notice of the division's deter­

mination, a contracting party aggrieved by the division's determination may 
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suIt of the review proceedings, along with information about the 
contracting party's right to judicial review, must then be sent to the 
contracting party by certified mail within ten days of the public 
hearing.237 If still unsatisfied, the contracting party has an addi­
tional thirty days to file a complaint in the superior court.238 Judi­
cial review would then be in accordance with established 
procedures for the review of administrative decisions.239 
5. Action to Be Taken by Victims 
Even after the Victim Compensation Division has received the 
contract, started its review process, and notified potential victims, a 
victim is not automatically entitled to the bond posted. Instead, any 
victim wishing to reach the funds must bring and prevail in a civil 
action against the defendant.240 However, the proposed legislation 
appeal to the attorney general, by serving on the attorney general a written 
notice to that effect. Thereupon the attorney general shaH immediately cause 
the division or his designee to hold a public hearing on the division's action 
appealed from. The division shaH notify the contracting party by certified mail 
of the determination upon appeal within ten days of the closing of the hearing. 
Such notice shaH include information regarding the contracting party's right to 
a petition for judicial review of the determination of the division. 
Id. 
237. See id. 
238. See id. § 14(e). 
239. See id. Subsection 14(e) proposes: 
Within thirty days of the date of the date of mailing of the notice of the divi­
sion's determination, the contracting party may file a complaint for judicial 
review in the superior court in the county in which the contracting party re­
sides or has his principal place of business, or in Suffolk County if the con­
tracting party does not reside or have a principal place of business in the 
commonwealth. Proceedings upon any such complaint shaH be in accordance 
with chapter 30A. If no petition is filed within the time specified, the decision 
of the division shaH be final. 
Id. 
240. See id. § 14(i). This subsection proposes: 

Upon making the determinations required by subsection (g), the division may 

continue to hold the bond filed in accordance with subsection (c), or may re­

quire the contracting party to file a new bond equal to the amount determined 

by the division to constitute proceeds arising from the activity that is substan­

tially related to a crime. The bond held by the division shall be used to satisfy, 

in part or in full, any civil judgment obtained by a victim against the defendant 

arising from the crime. 

Id. (emphasis added). 
In contrast, S. 852 dealt exclusively with an escrow account scheme: 

Upon making the determinations required by subsection (e), the division shall 

place into escrow all monies or other consideration remitted by the con­

tracting party, up to the amount determined by the division to constitute pro­

ceeds arising from activity that is substantiaHy related to the crime for which 
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significantly expands a victim's ability to bring civil actions against 
the defendant by extending the applicable statute of limitations. 
Rather than limiting victims to bringing actions within six years of 
being harmed, they will have the right to file suit anytime within 
three years of the last published legal notice.241 
6. Payments of Civil Judgment 
If after being "fully and finally prosecuted" the defendant is 
not convicted, the bond is to be returned to the contracting party.242 
On the other hand, if the defendant is convicted of the crime,243 a 
civil judgment obtained against him or her that arises from the 
crime may be satisfied by the bond posted with the Victim Compen­
sation Division.244 After all civil judgments are satisfied, or if no 
claims have been filed against the defendant or the contracting 
party during the three year period after the last publication, the 
remainder of the value of the bond will be split between the con-
the person has been charged or convicted. Any remaining monies or consider­
ation shall be returned to the contracting party. Any civil judgment against 
the defendant arising from the crime shall be paid from the proceeds being 
held in escrow, or from proceeds which may be received in the future. 
S. 852, § 14(f), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). 
241. See S. 1950, § 14(f). Section 14(f) proposes: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the General Laws with respect to the 
timely bringing of an action, any victim shall have the right to bring a civil 
action to recover money damages from a defendant or his legal representative 
within three years of the last mandatory published public notice provided for 
in subsection (e). 
Id. 
242. See id. § 14(n). This subsection proposes: "The division shall return to the 
contracting party the bond required in subsections (c) and (i) if the defendant is fully 
and finally prosecuted and is not convicted of the crime, or has not voluntarily admitted 
the commission of the crime." Id. This does not mean, however, that victims will be 
unable to obtain compensation as a result of their civil actions. Even if a defendant is 
found not guilty in a criminal proceeding, he may still be found responsible for injuries 
by a civil court. Although the Attorney General's role ends at this point, the notifica-· 
tion process and holding period for the funds will presumably protect victims' rights to 
recovery better than if there were no notoriety-for-profit legislation. 
243. In addition to governing defendants who have been charged with or con­
victed of a felony, the proposed legislation includes anyone who has voluntarily admit­
ted to committing a felony. See id. § 14(m). The purpose of this provision is to include 
people who admit and wish to profit from criminal activity, but who were not charged 
with a crime. These situations may include times when the Commonwealth decides not 
to prosecute or an admission by a person to the crime after the statute of limitations has 
expired. 
244. See id. § 14(n). "The bond required in subsections (c) and (i) shall not be 
used to satisfy any civil judgment for a victim until the defendant has been fully and 
finally convicted of the crime for which he has been charged or until the defendant has 
voluntarily admitted the commission of the crime." Id. 
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tracting party and the Victim Compensation Fund.245 The defend­
ant, therefore, may still profit in some way from his work, but at 
least some of the money will benefit crime victims in general. This 
provision serves to address Justice O'Connor's statement in Simon 
& Schuster that the money in question need only benefit victims 
generally, and not necessarily an actual victim: "We need only con­
clude that the State has a compelling interest in depriving criminals 
of the profits of their crimes, and in using these funds to compen­
sate victims. "246 
Finally, the proposed legislation includes a provision that pre­
vents a defendant or a contracting party from side stepping or 
avoiding the law.247 Any action that would defeat the purpose of 
the statute is void.248 In particular, the provision nullifies actions 
such as creating corporate entities or executing a power of attorney 
in order to keep an agreement secret, in order to avoid the 
processes established by the bill.249 
CONCLUSION 
Despite several recent criminal cases that evidence an immedi­
ate need for a law that protects the rights of crime victims in situa­
tions in which criminals profit from their notoriety, Massachusetts 
currently does not have a such a statute. In response, the Massa­
chusetts Attorney General's Office has filed a bill with the state 
245. See id. § 14(0). Section 14(0) proposes: 
After all civil claims instituted by victims against the defendant have been 
satisfied, or after three years of publication no claims have been filed, one-half 
of the value of the bond required in subsections (c) and (i) shall be returned to 
the contracting party. The remaining portion of the bond shall be deposited 
into the victim compensation fund maintained by the treasurer in accordance 
with section 4(c). 
Id. 
246. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 119 (1991). The Maryland statute reviewed in Curran v. Price also 
provided that funds in escrow that were unclaimed by victims would eventually be 
transferred to a general victim's compensation fund. See Curran v. Price, 638 A.2d 93, 
104 (Md. 1994). The Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged that this require­
ment was not narrowly tailored to ensure that a defendant not profit from the crime at 
the expense of the particular crime victim, but it noted that this did not appear to be a 
requirement under Simon & Schuster. See id. 
247. See S. 1950, § 14(q). This subsection proposes: "Any action taken by a de­
fendant, or his representative, whether by way of execution of a power of attorney, 
creation of corporate entities or otherwise, to defeat the purpose of this section shall be 
null and void." Id. 
248. See id. 
249. See id. 
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legislature that has been crafted to protect victims while remaining 
within the bounds of the Constitution. An "Act Relative to the 
Profits from Crime" should be enacted and signed into law, once 
again affirming the age-old adage that "crime does not pay." 
